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AbstrAct: Kant’s attempts to formulate a conception of  the harmony of  nature and freedom 
have two logical presuppositions. The first presupposition is the separation of  ought and is, 
which provides a logical formulation of  the separation of  freedom and nature. Kant might well 
have settled on the view that the separation between nature and freedom cannot be bridged. 
Why did Kant attempt to overcome said separation? The second presupposition of  Kant’s proj-
ect to bridge nature and freedom involves an ought→can inference, stating that moral obligation 
implies the possibility of  its fulfillment. There are at least two ways this inference can be under-
stood. There is a weak sense of  the inference, stating that no one is obliged to do the impossible. 
There is also a very strong sense of  the inference, stating that if  a moral obligation is found to 
obtain, it must then be possible to fulfill it. Kant interprets the ought→can inference in this strong 
as well as in the weak sense. nature, the law-governed totality of  what exists, must be understood 
as able to provide a suitable field for moral realization. The isomorphism between the lawfulness 
of  nature and that of  moral freedom animates Kant’s account of  moral judgment, and will pro-
vide the main focus of  the current investigation. Kant conceives of  nature and freedom as twin 
kingdoms, thus providing a theoretical model validating this ought→can inference. The weaker 
sense of  this ought→can inference does justice to moral judgment without requiring the awe-
some task of  bridging nature and freedom. Why, then, should we maintain the strong ought→can 
inference in our post-Kantian situation? i suggest that Kant’s insistence on the strong ought→can 
inference may yield an ethical approach to the ever more powerful ways in which human beings 
technologically transform nature, including human nature itself. 
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Kant’s attempts to formulate a conception of  the harmony of  nature and freedom 
have two logical presuppositions.1 The first presupposition is the ought/is distinction. 
1. Kant’s most sustained attempt at this can be found in his Critique of  Judgment, where both aesthetic and 
teleological judgment indicate a ‘supersensible ground’ of  nature and freedom. here, i will focus on the 
development of  this harmony in Kant’s moral philosophy. i choose this focus in light of  the importance of  
the ought/is distinction and ought→can inference at issue in harmonizing nature and freedom.
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The separation of  ought and is provides a logical formulation of  the separation of  free-
dom and nature. This is a presupposition of  the search for harmony between freedom 
and nature if  only because there is no need to seek harmony where there is no sepa-
ration in the first place. Kant might well have settled on the view that the separation 
between nature and freedom cannot be bridged. Why did Kant attempt to overcome 
said separation? after all, the logical validity of  the ought/is distinction should have 
inspired caution about such a project. The second presupposition of  Kant’s project to 
bridge nature and freedom involves the ought→can inference, stating that moral obliga-
tion implies the possibility of  its fulfillment. There are at least two ways this inference 
can be understood. There is a weak sense of  the inference, stating that no one is obliged 
to do the impossible. There is also a very strong sense of  the inference, stating that if  
a moral obligation is found to obtain, it must then be possible to fulfill it. in this sense 
of  the inference, a possibility of  fulfillment is automatically implied by the very fact of  
obligation and not just ingredient to the finding that an obligation obtains. This strong 
ought→can inference implies its weaker version in which the clear impossibility of  ful-
fillment, for example, relieves us of  any moral obligation to change the past. an undis-
puted impossibility always relieves us of  moral obligation. Barring this relief, the strong 
inference means that moral obligations postulate the possibility of  being realized. Kant 
interprets the ought→can inference in this strong sense in which the sense of  obligation 
precedes and demands the conditions of  its fulfillment. nature, the law-governed total-
ity of  what exists, must then be understood as able to provide a suitable field for moral 
realization. Kant’s account of  this possibility ultimately makes recourse to the postulate 
of  a god capable of  bringing about the highest good, combining happiness (natural 
goal) and moral virtue (freedom). as far as moral judgment goes, however, Kant also 
insists on the isomorphism bridging the lawfulness of  moral freedom and the lawfulness 
of  nature. This isomorphism will provide the main focus of  the current investigation. 
Kant’s account of  the Typic of  Pure Practical Judgment in the Critique of  Practical Reason2 
conceives of  nature and freedom as twin kingdoms, thus providing a theoretical model 
validating the ought→can inference.
The harmony of  nature and freedom is a concern for practical judgment. Kant 
takes the ought→can inference in a special strong sense, driving him to try to search 
for its validity through a harmony of  freedom and nature.3 This strong sense of  the 
ought→can inference adds a direction of  causal implication lacking in the weaker sense. 
The weaker sense of  the ought→can inference does justice to moral judgment with-
out requiring the awesome task of  bridging nature and freedom. Why, then, maintain 
the strong ought→can inference? i suggest that Kant’s insistence on the strong ought→
2. aK v. 67ff.
3. Following hintikka, one might reformulate Kant’s sense of  the ought→can inference: ‘it ought to be that 
ought implies can.’ This reformulation does not imply any claims about a harmony of  nature and freedom. 
For a discussion of  Kant regarding obligation and possibility, see: Jaako hintikka, ‘deontic Logic and its 
Philosophical moral,’ in Models for Modalities (dordrecht: reidel, 1969) and discussion of  this in Patrice 
Bailhache, Essai de logique déontique (Paris: vrin, 1991).
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can inference may yield an ethical approach to the ever more powerful ways in which 
human beings technologically transform nature, including human nature itself. 
The role of  possibility in Kant’s account of  practical reason will prove crucial to 
my inquiry, for the ought→can inference requires bridging natural possibility and moral 
necessity, so that nature is taken to be a matrix of  possibility not only for ontological 
but also for deontological actualization. accordingly, i shall begin by briefly clarifying 
the moral relevance of  the modal category of  possibility. This will require introducing 
Kant’s insistence on the heterogeneity of  sensibility and reason as highlighted in his 
claim concerning the immanence of  the modal categories. in light of  this, i will offer a 
reading of  the Typic of  Pure Practical Judgment, supplemented by a review of  Kant’s 
conception of  moral purposiveness in its relation to natural purposiveness found in the 
dialectic of  the first Critique and argued further in the Critique of  Teleological Judgment. 
From this discussion of  moral and natural purposiveness, i will draw some conclusions 
concerning the contemporary relevance of  the strong ought→can inference for an ethics 
of  technology based upon humanity’s perspectival situation, which bridges nature and 
freedom by grounding both theoretical and moral reflection.
The moraL reLevance oF The caTegory oF PossiBiLiTy
rather than possibility, isn’t it always necessity that characterizes moral obligation 
for Kant? i offer the following clarifying response to this question. The necessity of  moral 
obligation is connected with Kant’s conception of  the a priori. Wherever one finds neces-
sity in a connection one has discovered an a priori element in so far as necessity cannot 
be derived from experience. on Kant’s view, cognition, moral obligation and aesthetic 
(reflective) judgment all claim necessity, and each of  these three kinds of  necessity has 
distinguishing features. The necessity of  laws of  nature is such that physical events can 
never happen otherwise than under these laws. The necessity of  aesthetic reflective 
judgment is called exemplary necessity, the claim to a necessary connection between a 
judged representation and pleasure, such that i put forward my judgment as an exam-
ple of  how everyone ought to judge. in morality, too, necessity is rendered in terms of  
the word “ought.” The objective necessity of  an action is its morally obligatory status, 
a status that cannot be derived from experience. objectively necessary actions are, of  
course, subjectively contingent, which means that my will is under necessitation to act from 
duty. The possibility implied by moral obligation does not contradict the necessity of  
moral obligation, i.e., its a priori status. Taking moral actions as either logically or onto-
logically necessary makes no sense unless one qualifies obligatory acts as necessary, given 
the objective moral law, or as necessary for a good person. These phrases neatly shift the deon-
tic sense from the modal concept of  necessity unto the axiological ingredients “objec-
tive moral” or “good,” leaving necessity to function as a non-deontic modal term. Leibniz 
formulated theorems combining modal alethic and deontic logic in this way. in these 
theorems Leibniz clearly states the sense in which obligatory acts are necessary—under 
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the qualification “for the good man.” he also clearly formulates an implication con-
sistent with the necessity of  obligatory acts: “Whatever is obligatory is possible.” Kant 
certainly came to the same conclusion when he argues that “ought” implies “can,” even 
if  for Kant the freedom signified by this implication cannot be theoretically known.6 
The immanence oF The modaL caTegories7
With this in mind one sees how Kant can explicitly connect the moral ought with 
possibility within the context of  a discussion of  the difference between understanding 
and sensibility in §77 of  the Critique of  Judgment. aware of  the difference between the 
necessity and the possibility pertaining to moral obligation, Kant also uses the term 
“necessity” to refer to the ought of  moral obligation:
it is clear, therefore, that only because of  the subjective character of  our practical 
ability do we have to present moral laws as commands (and the actions conforming 
to them as duties) and does reason express this necessity not by is (i.e., happens) 
but by ought to be. This would not be the case if  we considered reason, regarding its 
causality, as being without sensibility (the subjective condition for applying reason 
to objects of  nature), and hence as being a cause in an intelligible world that 
harmonized throughout with the moral law. For in such a world there would be no 
difference between obligation and action, between a practical law that says what is 
possible through our doing, and the theoretical law that says what is actual through 
our doing. it is true that an intelligible world in which everything would be actual 
just because it is (both good and) possible...is for us a transcendent concept.
The faculty of  understanding provides a matrix of  possibility for experience and 
cognition. Pure reason provides principles of  the possibility of  experience, but not for its 
speculative employment in cognition. rather, as stated in the first Critique, pure reason’s 
provision of  possibility concerns moral obligation:
Pure reason, then contains, not indeed in its speculative employment, but in that 
practical employment which is also moral, principles of  the possibility of  experience, 
namely, of  such actions as, in accordance with moral precepts, might be met with 
in the history of  mankind. For since reason commands that such actions should 
take place, it must be possible for them to take place. consequently, a special kind 
of  systematic unity, namely the moral, must likewise be possible.9
. g. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (darmstadt - Berlin 1962 ff), vi, , 27.
. ibid., 279.
6. see note 2.
7. in the ‘amphiboly’ of  the first Critique, one finds the locus classicus of  Kant’s argument for the immanence 
of  the modal categories. given my concern for their relevance to practical judgment, i have chosen to 
argue from certain passages in the third Critique instead, because they clearly show Kant’s view on that 
issue.
. Kant, Critique of  Judgment, translated by Werner Pluhar (indianapolis: hackett Publishing company, 
197), aK v.03- (§76 comment). 
9. Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, translated by norman Kemp smith (new york: st. martin’s Press, 1929), 
B3 (canon of  Pure reason). Future references will give the page numbers of  the original B edition.
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viewing practical reason as provider of  the principles of  the possibility of  experience, 
Kant invokes the idea of  a moral world (a kingdom of  ends) that can be brought about 
just because it ought to be.10 The moral possibility of  a kingdom of  ends is an implication 
of  moral obligation established through the fact of  the moral imperative. This is pre-
cisely the ought→can inference in its strong sense. But how can practical reason provide 
the “principles of  the possibility of  experience,” as Kant not just states, but emphasizes? is 
not that the role of  understanding (Verstand), while reason (Vernunft) always exceeds the 
limits of  experience? This question furnishes the central problem of  the Typic of  Pure 
Practical Judgment.
The TyPic oF Pure PracTicaL JudgmenT
in cognition, understanding provides a matrix of  possibility, sensible intuition gives 
the actual through its reception of  the given, and transcendental imagination medi-
ates between the two faculties by means of  schemata. in the “Typic of  Pure Practical 
Judgment” the moral law demands practical fulfillment, while the lawfulness of  nature 
delimits what can be experienced and known as actual, i.e., it provides experiential and 
cognitive possibility. This marks the chasm between ought and is, viz., between freedom 
and nature. The question for practical judgment concerns how to render as possible for 
experience (in the natural terms of  experience) what is demanded as possible by moral 
obligation. Kant attempts to grasp the bridge from freedom to nature as a species of  
hypotyposis that he calls the typus, thus paralleling the function of  schematism in the first 
Critique. The term typus comes from the greek tupao, meaning “to render or sketch.” 
in rhetorical terminology it refers to a vivid pictorial rendering. Kant uses this term to 
indicate that the lawfulness of  nature provides a rendering of  moral lawfulness. The 
situation with pure morally practical judgment is different than that in cognitive judg-
ment in that there is no schematizing function of  imagination, no third faculty to make 
the rendering. rather, the lawfulness of  nature itself  provides the typus through which 
the moral law will be rendered.
Through the typus the legislative power of  understanding over experience provides 
a rendering of  the lawfulness of  pure practical reason. in this relation between reason 
and understanding Kant takes care to highlight the point that imagination plays no 
role.11 The faculty of  understanding (Verstand) is reason (Vernunft) itself  in its cognitive 
employment. even in the cognitive work of  understanding, however, reason surpasses 
its application to sensible experience in order to regulate and guide that very application 
which gives rise to knowledge. in this way, as stated in the first Critique, reason operates 
on understanding, rather than on appearances.12 yet more pertinent to the problem of  
the “Typic,” ideas (Ideen) of  reason make possible the transition from concepts of  nature 
10. For an interpretation of  the kingdom of  ends in terms of  deontic logic, see the texts cited in note 2.
11. aK v, 69.
12. B33
	 COSMOS	AND	HISTORY	 218
to practical concepts.13 The typus permits the transition from the moral concept of  free-
dom to concepts of  nature projecting empirical possibility. The conception of  lawfulness 
provides this bridge between freedom and nature. in order to appreciate the purposive-
ness implicit in this lawfulness, the account of  the Typic must be taken together with 
the suggestion from the Foundations of  the Metaphysics of  Morals that a kingdom of  ends 
can be conceived according to the analogy of  a kingdom of  nature, where a kingdom is 
defined as the systematic interconnection of  ends.
To better understand the function of  purposiveness in the Typic, let us digress brief-
ly and explore the purposive feature of  moral lawfulness with the help of  the Critique 
of  Teleological Judgment which complements the account in the dialectic of  the Critique 
of  Pure Reason. The lawfulness of  nature and moral lawfulness both exhibit purposive-
ness, and the ground of  the purposiveness of  the former is that of  the latter. reflective judgment 
is the mental power the principle of  which is purposiveness. This invites us to consider 
whether moral judgment, in so far as it employs the lawfulness of  nature as a typus for 
moral lawfulness, might either be a species of  reflective judgment or, at least, involve 
reflective judgment. however, at first sight this line of  thought seems blocked by Kant’s 
adamant insistence that moral judgments, like cognitive judgments, are determinative 
rather than reflective.
determinative judgment subsumes a given particular under an already given uni-
versal. reflective judgment seeks a universal under which to subsume a given particular. 
reflection means comparison, and here it means the comparison of  particulars in the 
search for a universal. reflective teleological judgment does not directly involve the 
power of  imagination, but rather puts reason into relation with understanding. This 
distinguishes it from aesthetic reflective judgment, which involves imagination in free 
play with understanding. There is one path that saves Kant’s contention that moral 
judgments are determinative, while also acknowledging reflective teleological judgment 
as an operation preliminary to moral judgment; this path involves recalling the role 
that reflective judgment plays with regard to determinative cognitive judgment. even 
though scientific inquiry and empirical concept formation are guided by reflective judg-
ment, both empirical and transcendental cognitive judgments that correlate concepts 
and objects still remain determinative judgments. reflective judgment orients empirical 
concept formation, but it does not give rise to knowledge directly. can we view reflec-
tive teleological judgment as guiding concept formation preparatory to morally deter-
mining judgments? concept formation in moral judgment occurs in the formulation of  
maxims and in the derivation of  actions from maxims. since moral judgment subsumes 
maxims rather than actions under the categorical imperative, reflective judgment must 
guide the formation of  maxims by reference to reason’s idea of  purposive lawfulness, 
just as reason regulates the understanding in the process of  homogenizing and specify-
ing the laws of  nature. This would explain the function of  the type in rendering the 




Kant’s argument that the lawfulness of  nature can furnish a typus for moral lawful-
ness ultimately rests upon his conception of  the primacy of  moral praxis. The purpo-
siveness of  morally practical reason lies at the root of  the idea of  the purposiveness 
of  nature that speculative reason employs in guiding scientific inquiry. This system of  
ends “has its source in the moral order, as a unity grounded in freedom’s own essential 
nature...”1 Kant insists on a connection between the ends of  nature and the ends of  
morality: “What use can we make of  our understanding, even in respect of  experience, 
if  we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest ends are those of  morality, and 
these we can know only as they are given us by pure reason.”1 Kant also ties the tran-
scendent extension of  reason to the idea of  moral purposiveness.
But the former purposive unity16 is necessary and founded on the will’s own essential 
nature and this latter unity [of  design in nature] which contains the condition 
of  its application in concreto must be so likewise. and thus the transcendental 
enlargement of  our knowledge, as secured through reason, is not to be regarded 
as the cause, but merely as the effect of  the practical purposiveness which pure 
reason imposes upon us.17 
in the account of  teleological judgment of  the third Critique, moral purposiveness is again 
seen as the basis of  our judgments concerning the purposiveness of  nature. reason, in 
its a priori provision of  lawfulness that is moral purposiveness gives lawfulness to nature 
under the understanding. understanding would have no ability to legislate were it not 
for reason, for the two are the same power of  reason, under the name of  reason apply-
ing in a way that will always surpass experience, while under the name of  understand-
ing, this conceptualizing power remains connected to appearances. We can grasp why 
Kant characterizes the operation of  judgment in the Typic of  Pure Practical Judgment 
as “pure,” when we recall the a priori rendering of  moral purposiveness through the 
medium of  the natural purposiveness that orients the understanding.
in our consideration of  possibility in Kant’s moral philosophy, we have seen that in 
addition to moral necessity Kant formulated a conception of  the possibility demanded 
by moral praxis in line with the ought→can inference. doing so gives us insight into the 
nature of  moral judgment as examined in the Typic of  Pure Practical Judgment. in 
our examination of  the Typic we saw that natural and moral lawfulness share a pur-
posive character and that the power of  imagination plays no role in moral judgment. 
natural purposiveness is a principle of  judgment, but not a feature of  the actual world 
of  appearances. despite the mediation of  the typus, moral judgment can never deter-
mine when an appearing action fulfils moral duty. The actualization of  moral freedom 
exceeds the imaginable, yet the Typic of  Pure Practical Judgment requires that moral 
freedom harmonize with natural possibility. Without any contribution from the power 
1. B
1. ibid.
16. sc., the ends of  morality
17. B
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of  imagination, the type renders moral freedom through the understanding’s legisla-
tive provision of  natural possibility, the conditions of  the possibility of  experience. For 
Kant, were we not morally purposive beings, we could not be cognitive beings nor 
could we be aesthetically judging beings. 
concLusion
Kant’s copernican revolution in thinking, which considers reason to wield leg-
islative authority over nature, is not complete until reason means practical reason. if  
practical reason ultimately roots our understanding of  nature, it becomes plausible to 
model practical lawfulness on natural lawfulness as Kant outlines in the “Typic.” The 
introduction of  a teleological dimension immanent in our theoretical attitude towards 
nature, but not present in nature itself, attests to this rootedness in the rational form 
of  our freedom as ends in ourselves. several major questions arise from a post-kantian 
standpoint, however. Within the purview of  evolutionary biology there is no longer any 
need for a teleological dimension immanent in our theoretical attitude towards nature. 
in fact, even a teleology submitted to the copernican turn proves theoretically unhelp-
ful. Kant was clearly wrong when he remarked that there will never be a “newton of  
the grass blade.” so, what becomes of  nature as an experiential field for the fulfillment 
of  our moral demands? i suggest that there still remains something, not any teleol-
ogy immanent in our pure theoretical attitude towards natural lawfulness, but rather 
a system of  purposes expressly imposed upon nature through technological interven-
tions in otherwise natural processes. This is nothing new, of  course, although these 
interventions have become ever more radical transformations of  nature. human beings 
adapt themselves and other organisms to ends they choose by design, carrying further 
the process of  adaptation, which in nature remains a thoroughly mechanical process. 
From a Kantian moral standpoint, the natural mechanical process of  adaptation would 
have to be judged as cruelly inhumane. even so, the possibility of  humanizing nature 
through the imposition of  human design upon adaptive processes itself  poses manifold 
dangers. at least two fields of  awareness suggest themselves here. First, the power to 
impose human design upon nature rests ultimately on the fact that humanity is part 
of  nature, thus making any intervention into natural processes a point of  vulnerability 
for humans both as individuals and as a species. secondly, this vulnerability points out 
the crucial role of  prudence, the intellectual excellence of  deliberation concerning the 
means of  attaining flourishing, which is traditionally the natural purpose of  human 
existence. Taking Kant’s project of  bridging freedom and nature in light of  the imposi-
tion of  design upon nature, the strong ought→can inference implied in this project turns 
out to be redeemable through technology. Technology may design nature (i intention-
ally do not say “redesign,” as nature is not designed in the first place) to be amenable to 
human moral demands, yet not without posing risks calling for prudence. 
at first sight, it seems unlikely that nature cooperates with human moral inten-
tions just because human beings try to engage with nature by using the same power of  
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reason they use in moral reflection. i would argue that something like this must be the 
case, though. conceptual determination in scientific inquiry is perspectival—depending 
on what we want to know and do with our knowledge, we will take one approach or 
another. Whatever approach we choose, it will always involve human beings engaging 
with a reality of  which they form a part. conceptual determination in moral reflection 
is also perspectival—what are maxims if  not perspectives through which we conceptu-
ally determine actions? For Kant, moral reflection forms the heart of  the human per-
spective in its self-reflective capacity. The human perspective in its self-reflective mode 
takes account of  narrower individual and collective purposes within a broader moral 
kingdom of  ends. The human perspective knows itself  as a perspective upon a reality it 
engages and of  which it forms a part, and this knowledge encompasses both theoretical 
and morally-practical reflection.
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